A gate on the data of every district you serve.
You set the allow list: which of your people and agents reach which districts, and for what. The district approves it, and from then on every request is checked against that approval and written to a record either of you can pull.
Built for the day a breach happens
Certification has not prevented breaches. The providers breached in recent incidents were certified.
The key that decrypts your districts' records lives outside your environment, in a custody tier the district elects, and at every tier the key policy denies decryption, and data key generation, to us and to you. A full compromise of your estate yields ciphertext the intruder cannot open.
Setup takes four connections and about a week
Connect the MCP gateway, point Guardian at your current key, connect the workflow tool that assigns the work, and connect the CRM. That is the whole of it.
What does not happen.
- No schema change.
- No application rewrite.
- No data migration.
- No roster authored.
- No spreadsheet filled in.
- No integration written.
Your product does not change and your engineers keep their access. Guardian reads the answers out of the systems you already run and shows you what it found.
Recent breaches at certified providers
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DEC 2024PowerSchoolBreached · paid
Roughly 62 million student and 9.5 million teacher records. PowerSchool paid, and months later the attacker approached individual districts and extorted them separately with the same data.
The payment bought the vendor nothing, and the districts paid for it a second time.
Source: Alliant -
SEP 2025 · MAY 2026Instructure (Canvas)Breached twice · paid
Compromised twice in roughly eight months by the same group, first through its Salesforce environment, then through a production vulnerability disclosed in early May 2026. The group claimed data on approximately 275 million individuals across nearly 9,000 institutions. Instructure paid and received shred logs as confirmation of destruction.
Breached twice by the same group, so the reassurance that a vendor learns and hardens does not hold.
Source: WRAL -
AUG 2026Frontline EducationBreached
Discovered August 14, 2026 and disclosed in late September. Entry through a vulnerability in third-party software Frontline relied on, not its own systems. School district employee Social Security numbers, email and physical addresses. At least 1,210 employees confirmed at one district; the incident-wide total is undisclosed.
The way in was a trusted third-party connection, which is the reach Guardian bounds.
Source: eSecurity Planet
Three companies, three entry points, one outcome. In each case the records were readable because the key that opened them sat in the same estate as the data. Two of the three paid.
How a breach typically unfolds
Dwell
The intruder arrives through a credential or a trusted connection and waits, often for weeks, learning the estate.
Hunt
It looks for what opens the data: the key, the service credential, the account permitted to export.
Take everything
It exports in bulk and leaves with records it can read.
All three break on the same fact. The wait turns up nothing worth finding, the hunt reaches no key inside the estate, and what leaves is ciphertext. Your estate stops being the place where the keys are.
Your exposure today
Hundreds of districts in one store
Sharing one schema and one set of credentials.
Uninsured since January 2026
Standard endorsements now let carriers exclude generative-AI claims across roughly 70 percent of the US market. The coverage gap
Access you cannot scope
Support engineers, database staff, account managers, offshore desks, the companies you pass data to, and your own agents.
No proof of what was touched
Application logs show queries. Reconstructing which district a named actor reached takes weeks.
What Guardian puts in place.
One list you do not write
Guardian reads who does what from your workflow tool and CRM and proposes the allow list. The district approves it.
A check on every request
Five conditions, decided at the moment of the request. Anything the district did not approve is denied.
Keys outside your environment
In a custody tier the district elects, under a policy that denies decryption to us and to you.
A record both sides can pull
Actor, district, operation and outcome, in a tamper-evident log.
What stays the same, and what moves
You keep operating the data, running the product, and owning the district relationship. What moves is where the key sits and who can see the record, and that single move pays on four separate fronts.
An attacker doing reconnaissance sees that bulk export returns ciphertext, that every read is attributed and bounded, and that the key is not in your estate. The expected payoff drops.
The control does not have to stop the theft. It has to make you the wrong target. You do not have to be unbreakable. You have to be a worse afternoon's work than the provider next door, and an attacker choosing between two targets is doing exactly that arithmetic.
Change your posture, not your work.